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Abstract 
The reusable Manned Space Shuttle has been flying into Space and returning to earth for more than 25 
years. The Space Shuttle's uses various types of elastomers and they play a vital role in mission 
success. The Orbiter has been in service well past its design life of 10 years or 100 missions. As part of 
the aging vehicle assessment one question under evaluation is how the elastomers are performing. This 
paper will outline a strategic assessment plan, how identified problems were resolved and the integration 
activities between subsystems and Aging Orbiter Working Group. 
Introduction 
The Aging Orbiter Working Group (AOWG) focus on elastomers was sharpened while performing pre-
launch checkouts during a helium signature test in preparation for "return to flight" (RTF) with Space 
Shuttle Discovery (Orbiter Vehicle, OV-103) flight number 31. A leak was detected in the gaseous 
hydrogen flow control valve. The AOWG supported the failure analysis (FA) of this nitrile/Buna N 0-ring 
and results pointed out the need to assess elastomer usage on the Orbiters. One of the most important 
configurations of the Orbiter is where interfaces come together in a mating condition. The majority of 
these interfaces contain metallic and non-metallic materials. A proper seal is mandatory to eliminate any 
leak paths and elastomers can play this vital role. Leak paths can also provide opportunities for moisture 
to initiate metallic corrosion problems. The AWOG defined elastomers as a polymer, which upon 
deformation and subsequent release of the deforming force, returns to approximately its original shape 
and dimensions. The term rubber is often used interchangeably with elastomer, though a rubber is 
compounded with an elastomeric polymer and various additives and curing agents, and is typically cured 
at some elevated temperature. The AOWG identified the following elastomer types used on Orbiters; 
Butyl (propellant, high vacuum and non oil resistant), Ethylene-propylene-diene-monomer (EPDM - 
hydrazine resistant), Neoprene (flame, weather and oil resistant or general purpose), Fluorocarbon (Viton, 
Kel-F and Kalrez - oil, solvent, fuel, corrosive industrial chemical, ultraviolet and ozone resistant), 
Silicone rubber (high temperature and ozone resistant) and Nitrile/Buna-N rubber (fuel and oil resistant). 
In addition, when investigating seal performance the polyurethane type revealed some problems that will 
be discussed. The Orbiter utilizes elastomers in the various configurations; valves (check, control and 
relief), regulators, electrical connectors, pressure switches, vibration buffers, air lock, hatch, doors, 
umbilicals, quick disconnects and pyrotechnics. Elastomeric materials can be beneficial with repair of 
metallic or non-metallic anomalies. The scope of elastomer usage can be valued by just assessing one 
simple material - nitrile rubber. There is approximately 1,900 individual component or detailed locations 
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where nitrile rubber is used on the Orbiter. A good percentage of these parts are considered critical. The 
question that the AOWG formulated is - can degradation of nitrite rubber contribute to this subsystem's 
hardware not performing to designed requirements? The importance of assessing aging elastomers is 
increased since some lacked a defined shelf, age or usage life. The cost to resolve an elastomer failure 
outweighs the original procurement cost by several magnitudes. As future Space travel is extended to 
longer timelines understanding elastomer aging will become priceless. The Space Shuttle's hardware can 
provide the necessary aging knowledge resource to help define elastomer life limits and minimize impacts 
to future space explorations. 
Results 
The Orbiter contains three gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow control valves (FCV) that regulate pressure in 
support of the three main engines. During pre-launch helium leak checks it was determined that one of the 
three FCV's leaked helium. The analysis of leak rate directed that the Buna-N 0-ring from the leaking 
FCV, identified as LV-58 for main engine #3 be removed and replaced. The high magnified inspection of 
removed 0-ring identified radial cracks that could have provided leak paths across sealing surfaces. 
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Figure 1: Radial cracks on failed 0-ring 
The remaining 0-rings on the other two FCVs were also removed and replaced with new 0-rings to insure 
no leakage and successful launch of Discovery. Atlantis and Endeavour had their FCV 0-rings removed 
and replaced. FA investigation determined that 6 of the 9 0-rings from all three Orbiters contained cracks. 
The one that leaked and initiated the problem was the most severe. Additional FA work included laser 
dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an 
Instron tensile machine. The FCV by design has a 9-mil (0.009 in.) gap that allows exposure of o-ring to 
ozone, air and elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process leading to cracking. 
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Figure 2: Installed GH2 Flow Control Valves 
Additional 0-rings were found in storage at both Marshall Space Flight Center and Kennedy Space Center 
of various ages. A reference curve was generated for DMA glass transition temperature (Td versus shelf 
life storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. There was a difference noted for modulus and shore A 
hardness on the cracked o-ring that initiated the investigation.
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Figure 3: Tg versus age of used and unused Buna-N 0-rings 
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The failed o-ring also had white frosting discoloration providing more evidence that the radial cracks 
could be attributed to ozone attack. These o-rings are exposed to dry purged air the majority of their post 
installed static environmental life. The purged air is provided with electrical motors and frequent 
lightning strikes increase the normal ozone levels. 
Figure 4: Lightning strike at launch pad during normal thunderstorms 
Many may confuse the effects of ozone and oxidation on rubber 0-rings, but the two factors yield 
different results: (a) ozone attacks only the surface of the 0-ring to cause rubber cracking, but oxidation 
causes a hardening that begins at the surface and progresses throughout the entire 0-ring; (b) temperature 
has little effect on the rate of ozone attack, but in an oxidizing environment, each 10° C increase roughly 
doubles the rate of oxidation; (c) strain in the 0-ring has no effect on oxidation reactions, but strain 
increases the rate of crack growth in the presence of ozone. During launch countdown and loading of 
cryogenic fluid the 0-rings are exposed to cryogenic temperatures and 105° F on separate sides of sealing 
surfaces of 0-ring. This environment provides strains and aging effects that are needed to degrade 0-ring. 
A post installed operational life was implemented of 3 years to mitigate cracking concerns. These 0-rings 
will be removed in the future from each Orbiter and tested to better understand aging effects. 
Another Orbiter elastomer failure was in a regulator used in the fuel cell power reactant subsystem. Again 
the problem was detected during pressure decay leak checks failing quantity allowed over a specified 
amount of time. The FA identified that the valve stem's elastomer flashing material was inadequately 
trimmed during a manufacturing process and age hardening of material allowed a particle to interfere with 
the sealing surface. Further FA investigation the diaphragm also showed cracking potential and the 
original neoprene material was changed to more resistant EPDM for future configurations. The fuel cell 
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regulators and purge valves have also encountered problems with hardening of o-rings. A limited life 
requirement insures potential issues are managed. 
The Orbiter's nose wheel steering actuator revealed low pressure hydraulic fluid threshold failures. The 
FA investigation identified an 0-ring aging problem used in the pressure switch which allowed the 
diaphragm to experience out of tolerance readings. Even though Nitrile 0-rings should survive many years 
when exposed continuously to hydraulic fluids there are some examples of failures. The inspection 
requirements prior to installation could be improved with high magnification and aided by light. The pre-
existing condition of any 0-ring can affect the operational age life. 
The Orbiter uses elastomers in areas where off gassing and total mass loss (TML) are important 
requirements to eliminate contamination during on orbit vacuum exposures. There have been several 
cases where improper bake out was not performed prior to usage. These instances when found caused 
operational impacts to remove material and perform bake out procedures. Process control and properly 
communicating requirements to all persons involved in the process has been recognized as important 
corrective actions. The protection from Ultraviolet light exposure should be insured after elastomers are 
precision cleaned and repackaged in clean room materials. 
The sabot seals used in parachute mortar assemblies are compounded with polyurethane material. They 
were found cracked, yellowing and embrittled prior to use but after installation. The storage conditions 
after installations and age may have contributed to dry rotting and degrading material to the point of 
where they could not be used. These seals were older than 10 years and are installed early in the build up 
of the mortar assembly. Shore A hardness readings indicated material did not meet requirements. Upon 
requesting new seals to be manufactured the material used previously was not available due to 
obsolescence. A new material was chosen and post installed storage conditions were improved with a 
controlled environment to minimize the aging process. 
Figure 5: Failed polyurethane mortar assembly seal 
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Recently the AOWG recognized that historical information associated with each elastomer's post 
operational material property characteristic is not readily available. What are the real aging effects since 
no methods have been established for evaluating aged non problem components? Historically only 
problems have been evaluated and sometimes these low cost elastomers are just replaced during 
refurbishment at vendors with no FA performed. The Space Shuttle Program is transitioning hardware 
from various storage locations to a no not retain mode and opportunities to capture this information are 
being reduced. There have been instances where the AOWG recognizes hardware and request for this to 
be retained for further evaluation. Kennedy Space Center's facilities and equipment have also experienced 
elastomer failures with the age extending back into the 1960's vintage. As modifications proceed to 
upgrade for the next manned space program opportunities will arise to capture aged material data. There 
have been findings during refurbishment activities where 40 year old elastomers were staged for 
installation. Awareness communicated from AOWG to the technicians identified the need to capture 
aging data and these items were flagged. The AOWG has obtained these materials and will continue to 
test and evaluate properties in attempt to provide age trend data. Currently there is no funding to perform 
this assessment for either the Orbiter's or KSC equipment elastomeric materials. 
Elastomeric material is used for beneficial repair methods of metallic and non-metallic materials. This 
material is monitored for property performance and doesn't provide a risk upon usage. The aging of this 
repair material is only monitored with inspections and if found to have a problem is removed and 
replaced. No aging studies to date have been performed on removed material. 
The AOWG has a plan to evaluate Orbiter hardware and identify risks. They have identified all elastomer 
materials and their respective components of where they are installed. These parts are assessed for 
criticality and where used. Generic questions are formulated by the AOWG and forwarded to responsible 
subsystem personnel to address static and dynamic environments. This life cycle assessment of the 
elastomer can flag out aging concerns. Historical problems are then reviewed for trending. Inspection, 
acceptance, packaging, storage and supportability methods are evaluated. Although not fully implemented 
a plan to retrieve all elastomers upon refurbishment of a component at any original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) or depot repair facility has been developed to support aging assessment. 
Opportunities to capture aging data on elastomers exist. 
Conclusion 
The Space Shuttle Orbiters contain thousands of elastomers located in hardware interfaces and 
components performing critical operations. The age of these elastomers can range from new to greater 
than 25 years. There have been elastomer failures and FA investigations indicate problems may have 
stemmed from original material to the environment that they are exposed to. Elastomers do age and 
become embrittled. The elastomer aging effects are known for some that have failed but not fully 
understood for ones that have been in operation with no failures. The design of elastomer usage is 
important and understanding each one's life cycle can point out potential problems. Elastomers are fairly 
inexpensive and should not be underestimated in their forgiving nature. Resolving elastomer problems are 
costly and can impact schedules when certification requirements of spares requires lengthy acceptance 
test and or special cleaning processes to return to print. Conservative approaches with elastomers will 
minimize problems. The Orbiter project is proceeding to understand elastomer aging effects and may 
require additional funding. Facilities and equipment elastomers are very similar to flight hardware and 
information from this venue may provide beneficial comparisons. Opportunities exist to collect, analyze 
and develop adequate aging characteristics. These opportunities could be shared with industry and 
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academia to improve effectiveness of hardware and efficiency of operations during turnaround activities. 
More stringent requirements can insure elastomers don't reduce risk. 
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